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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
EVE A. SMITH, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
WALTER THOMAS SMITH, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Case No. 20458 
* * * * * * * 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
GOVERNING STATUTE 
This matter is controlled by the provisions of Section 
30-3-5, Utah Code Ann. 1953 which provides in its relevant 
portions: 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, 
the Court may include in it such orders in 
relation to the . . . property and 
parties, . , . as may De equitable. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action for divorce was commenced by the appellant 
January 10, 1983. (R. 2). The contested issues presented to 
the trial court involved determination of what was, and the 
division of the marital property. (R. 138-145). The main area 
of contest involved the home of the parties. After their 
marriage, the parties had intended to build a home on a lot 
owned by the respondent in Summit Park, Utah. The parents of 
the appellant asked them to build a home on land which they 
owned as part of a large parcel around their own home. 
(R. 149-150, 227-228). Determining to accept this gift, trie 
parties changed their plans and built a home on a lot deeded to 
tne parties by the parents of tne appellant. This was 
formalized in a written agreement (Exhibit 10, a copy of which 
is included herein as Appendix A). 
The parents of the appellant deeded a half interest in 
tne lot to the parties and retained a half interest in the lot 
themselves. (Exhibit 10). The respondent built the home of 
the parties on the land. (R. 194). He was a contractor and 
built the home himself. (R. 194-195, 216-217). The parties 
borrowed $55,000 (R. 147, 163), the respondent spent approxi-
mately $31,000 of his own money constructing the home (Exhibits 
3 & 12, R. 195, 214-217) and appellant contributed $10,000 of 
her funds in constructing the home. (R. 155-158, 166). 
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At trial, appellant asserted that she was entitled to 
be awarded the value of the land given to the parties by her 
parents. The trial court rejected that position. in support 
of the appellant's asserted position, she offered the testimony 
of her father which testimony was excluded by the Court based 
on the parol evidence rule as a result of the written agreement 
of the parties (R. 229-231, Exhibit 10, Appendix A). The Court 
also concluded that the $32,000 labor of the respondent and tne 
$10,000 of the appellant were contributions to the joint 
marital estate being accumulated by the parties and should not 
be separately returned to the parties. (R. 245-246). 
The appellant believes these determinations were 
incorrect. It is her position that the value of the gifted 
land and "ner" $10,000 should be returned to her, though she 
does not believe the respondent should be awarded his 
$31,000.00. It is respondent's position that the Court treated 
both of the parties fairly and equitably in its rulings and 
those rulings should oe sustained on this appeal. 
The respondent believes that the appellant's retire-
ment account should have been valued for division purposes as 
of the date of trial, not the date of separation. (Exhibit 9, 
Appendix B attached hereto). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married September 4, 1977. (R. 146, 
162). This was the second marriage for Mr. Smith and the tnird 
marriage for Mrs. Smith. (R. 162). After the parties were 
married, Mrs. Smith's parents gave them one acre of six acres 
owned by them on which to build a home. (R. 147, 149-150, 
Exnibit 10, Appendix A). The specific land given was not part 
of the original land purchased by Mrs. Smith's parents in 1938, 
it was property acquired by them between 12 and 15 years before 
the trial of this matter. (R. 228). 
Mr. Frank Armstrong, Mrs. Smith's father, is an 
attorney (R. 227) who drafted the agreement between the parties 
(Exhibit 10) and the deeds wnich completed tne gift to tne 
parties and effected the return of the half interest in the 
land on wnich the parties built their house. (R. 229). Tne 
Court determined that as of the date of trial this land had a 
value of $135,000, (R. 244) accepting the professional opinion 
of Gary R. Free (R. 236), and rejecting the opinion of 
Mrs. Sinitn that it was worth $150,000 (R. 153) and tne opinion 
of Mr. Smith that it was worth $100,000 (R. 215-216). 
Counsel for Mrs. Smith asked Mr. Armstrong when he was 
testifying, "Why did you make the deed to both Eve and Walt?" 
(R. 229). Counsel for Mr. Smith objected, asserting the parol 
evidence rule. (R. 229). This was argued to the Court who 
ruled: 
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It appears to me, gentlemen, that 
Exhibit 10, which is the Memorandum of 
Agreement which has been referred to here 
between Mr. and Mrs. Armstong and the 
parties in this action, seeks to set forth 
the understanding of the parties behind the 
conveyances in question, and unless it can 
be established initially that there is some 
lack of clarity or some ambiguity in that 
agreement, that I am compelled to sustain 
the objection regarding parole (sic) 
evidence. It appears to me that the 
language of the agreement is rather 
straigntforward and clear on its face, Mr. 
West. It is therefore my determination that 
tne objection as to parole (sic) evidence 
regarding the reason why seems to go behind 
the four corners of the agreement which has 
been received as an exhibit, and therefore 
I'm going to sustain the objection. 
(R. 230-231). 
After the land had been deeded to the parties, the 
home was physically constructed by Mr. Smith (R. 194) through 
the vehicle of nis construction company VIKO Building 
Specialties (R. 165, 166, 194). To build the home the parties 
borrowed $55,000 from Western Savings and Loan. (R. 147, 
163). To this was added $10,000 from Mrs. Smith. (R. 155-158, 
166). The home cost approximately $86,000 to build not 
including the value of the labor of Mr. Smith. (R. 167-168). 
Mr. Smith testified tftat from his construction 
company, VIKO Building Specialties, he contributed approxi-
mately $31,000 to construct the home. (R. 215). Mr. Smith 
testified extensively on direct and cross examination about the 
details of cnecks and invoices. (R. 168-190, 194-214, 
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219-223). In reviewing the offered exhibits, Mr. Smith 
agreed he should deduct several hundred dollars from his 
original estimates as set forth in Exhibit 12, which in turn 
was modified by Exhibit 3. (R. 168-169, 195-196). This 
reduced nis cash contribution to the home from $32,000 to just 
over $31,000. The Court determined that the gift of the lot 
was not an advance on inheritance. (R„- page not stamped, 
Transcript 109 found between R. 244 and 245, lines 14 and 15). 
The Court further held: 
[I] further find that his evidence has only 
failed to support his claim of some 
additional $32,000 as an offset to him, and 
I refuse to allow that. I feel likewise 
that the evidence has established that the 
contribution of the plaintiff's savings 
towards the down payment on the home falls 
in the same category. The parties got 
married. They anticipated that everything 
would work out. They contributed what they 
had, both in the form of expertise, 
knowledge and what little savings they might 
have nad towards the building of this home, 
and I believe that that was an expected 
appropriate contribution for them to make. 
I therefore decline to make any offsets for 
those sums. I might add that the defen-
dant's payment of certain pre-existing debts 
of the plaintiff falls in the same category. 
(R. 245-246). 
Appellant asserts that the Court failed to find that 
the evidence sustained plaintiff's claim that he had 
*The Court should be advised that Tr. Page 54, R. 202 is 
out of place. It belongs between R. 189 and 190. 
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contributed $31,000 to $32,000 toward the construction of the 
house. That is not correct. The appellant specifically 
objected (Appendix D attached hereto) to this proposed finding 
(Appendix C attacned hereto) when they were filed by the 
respondent (R. 92-94) specifically pointing out that there was 
a failure of evidence to uphold the contribution of $32,000 by 
Mr. Smith. (R. 93). That objection was overruled by the Court 
who accepted the proposed findings which include the finding 
regarding the contributions of the parties to the creation of 
the marital estate which in large measure is the house of the 
parties. (R. 147, R. 92-94, R. 97-105, R. 113-127, Appendix E 
attached hereto). 
The Court found based on the stipulation of the 
parties and Exhibit P-9, that the plaintiff had a retirement 
account in the Utah State Retirement System from her employment 
at the University of Utah. The accumulated benefits of the 
plaintiff were $587.23 in September of 1977; $7,094.21 in 
December of 1982 and $10,588.22 in September of 1984. 
(Exhibit P-9; Appendix B). 
Based on testimony, its determinations and accepting 
the stipulation of the parties, the Court ruled that: (1) the 
home would be sold; (2) from the proceeds of sale the 
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Armstrongs were to be paid their interest in the land plus 
reimoursement for accrued taxes and improvements that they 
paid; (3) the remaining proceeds of sale were to be divided 
equally between the parties. The Court ruled that Mr. Smith 
was not to receive credit for the $31-32,000 he had put into 
the home nor was Mrs. Smitft to receive credit for the $10,000 
she had put into the home or any credit for the gift of the 
land to ooth parties by ner parents; (4) an offset from the 
proceeds of the home was to be made for the retirement account 
accumulated by the wife between the time of the marriage of the 
parties and their separation; (5) each of the parties was 
awarded the property, furniture, fixtures, appliances that eacn 
had brought into the marriage. (R. 113-121, 122-127, 242-247). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court hearing a divorce is charged to fairly 
and equitably divide the property of the parties; this includes 
consideration of property that is gifted to the parties, 
inherited by the parties or to be inherited by the parties. 
Bushell v. Bushell, 649 P.2d 85 (Utah 1982); Weaver v. Weaver , 
21 Utah 2d 166, 442 P.2d 928 (1968); Wilkins v. Stout, 588 P.2d 
145 (Utah 1978). The trial court correctly applies this 
criteria in the instant matter. 
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Property gifted to one of the parties which is there-
after incorporated by them into a family home can be appro-
priately awarded by a trial court to the spouse whose family 
had not gifted the property to the parties, Bushell v. Busnell, 
649 P.2d 85 (Utah 1982), thus dividing the value of that 
property is appropriate. 
The parol evidence rule was properly applied to 
prohibit the introduction of testimony regarding intent where 
an agreement was drawn by appellant's father, a lawyer, to 
carry out the gift of certain property and it was clear and 
unambiguous in its terms. (R. 231). Hartman v. Potter, 596 
P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979); Commercial Bldg. Corp. v. Blair, 565 
P.2d 776, 778 (Utah 1977). 
The retirement account of the appellant should have 
been valued for division purposes as of the date the action was 
heard by the Court, not as of the date of separation. Fletcher 
v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980). 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXECUTED THE MANDATE OF 
THIS COURT TO FAIRLY AND 
EQUITABLY DIVIDE THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTIES 
This court has repeatedly stated the rule that 
S 30-3-5, Utah code Ann. 1953, requires a trial court to fairly 
and equitably divide the property that is brought before it in 
a divorce action. 
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There is no fixed formula which a trial 
judge must follow in making a division of 
properties. Cox v. Cox, Utah 532 P.2d 994 
(1975). It is the prerogative of the Court 
to make whatever disposition of property it 
deems fair, equitable and necessary for the 
protection and welfare of the parties. 
Hamilton v. Hamilton, Utah, 562 P.2d 235 
(1977). Its division will not be disturbed 
on appeal unless the record shows that there 
has been an abuse of discretion. Jesperson 
v. Jesperson, Utah, 610 P.2d 326 (1980). 
Berry v. Berry, 635 P.2d 68 at 69 (Utah 1981). 
In the distribution of the marital estate, 
there is no fixed rule or formula. The 
statutory standard is established in section 
30-3-5, the Court may make such orders in 
relation to the parties as may be equit-
able. The responsibility of the trial court 
is to endeavor to provide a just and equit-
able adjustment of their economic resources 
so that tne parties might reconstruct their 
lives on a happy and useful basis. 
Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144 at 148 (Utah 1978). The trial 
court did precisely that in the instant matter and that ruling 
should be affirmed. 
The objections of the appellant in this matter fall 
into two areas. The first is that the appellant should nave 
been awarded the value of the land on which the home of the 
parties was built because it came to the parties from her 
parents as a gift. There is no question that the land on which 
the home of the parties was built was gifted to them by Mr. and 
Mrs. Armstrong, the appellant's parents. There is also no 
question that the appellant contributed approximately $10,000 
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toward building the home. Respondent also contributed between 
$31-32,000 of his money plus his expertise, personal labor and 
the architectural services of his father to construct the 
home. (R. 165, 194, 217). 
The trial court had before it a case where the 
appellant, respondent and both of their families had contri-
buted to tne accumulation of the major asset of the marital 
estate, their home. The Court appropriately divided that asset 
following the criteria estaolished by this Court when it simply 
divided the asset between the parties - refusing to return to 
eitner party the contribution of that party or the contribution 
of the families of the parties. (R. 246). 
This Court has ruled in an appropriate case, property 
that has been gifted or inherited may be awarded in whole or in 
part to the other spouse. Weaver v. Weaver, 21 Utah 2d 166, 
442 P.2d 928 (1968). It has ruled that a trial court may, in 
making a division of property, consider future events sucn as 
an inheritance. Wilkins v. Stout, 588 P.2d 145 (Utah 1978); or 
value projections oased on historical earnings, English v. 
English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977). 
In this case the gift and contribution factors were 
considered, weighed and ruled upon by the trial court. 
(R. 242-247). This case is factually dissimilar from Jesperson 
v. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326 (Utah 1980) cited and relied upon by 
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appellant. In that action, property was owned by Mrs. 
Jesperson prior to the marriage of the parties was returned to 
her despite having been placed in joint tenancy and having been 
carried through several sales. Mr. Jesperson owned virtually 
no assets at the time of marriage, yet was given a share of the 
increased assets accumulated through the purchase, improvement 
and sale of three different mobile homes but this was based 
upon starting from the mobile home owned by Mrs. Jesperson at 
the time of the marriage. The trial court awarded Mrs. 
Jesperson $19,027; the purchase price of the last mobile home 
owned by the parties which had been sold just before the 
divorce. The remaining proceeds of the sale were then divided 
on a ratio of 77% to 23% as the Court determined that that was 
the value of the assets held by the parties. 
The appellant, Mr. Jesperson, attacked that decision 
on the basis that title in the vehicle was joint, he was an 
equal owner and he should have been awarded half the proceeds. 
This Court affirmed the trial court's rejection of that argu-
ment holding that title was not conlusive that a gift had been 
made. 
In the instant action before the Court, there is no 
question that a gift was made to both the appellant and the 
respondent. This was the testimony of each of the parties and 
Mr. Armstrong. It is also clearly stated in Exhibit 10 
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(Appendix A) by Mr. Armstrong. Both parties and their families 
contributed in improving the realty and making use of the gift. 
Respondent would agree with appellant that this Court 
has ruled trial courts are not bound by title considerations in 
dividing property. This was true not only from the Jesperson 
decision but the cited cases of Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 
338 (Utah 1980) and Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931 (Utah 
1982). in this latter decision, this Court specifically upheld 
a decision of the trial court awarding an interest in property 
to the wife when the nusband (arguably) brought the property 
into the marriage. As this Court stated: 
Assuming arguendo that the property was 
validly conveyed to the husband prior to the 
marriage, it does not follow that it must be 
awarded solely to him in a property settle-
ment, especially where the wife has used her 
separate resources to purchase the property 
from the husband's mother and the clear 
pending liens. 
In some instances, equity will require that 
each party to a divorce recover the separate 
property he or she brought to the marriage. 
E.g., Preston v. Preston, Utah, 649 P.2d 705 
(1§82 )1 However, ETTat rule is not 
invariable and we find no abuse of 
discretion in the district court's not 
applying it in the circumstances of this 
case. 
Workman v. Workman, 652 P.2d 931 at 933 (Utah 1982). 
in Bushell v. Bushell, 649 P.2d 85 (Utah 1982), the 
parties were married and had two children. They purchased 
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farmland and equipment to operate the farm. After eight years 
of marriage, they were divorced. They then remarried. During 
their second marriage, the husband's father gave him 14 acres 
of land to which the parties moved and built a foundation for a 
mobile home, bought and placed a mobile home on the foundation, 
then moved into that home. The second marriage lasted three 
years. The trial court awarded the wife the one acre on which 
the mobile home was located and the right to use the other 13 
acres until she ceased to use the mobile home as a residence or 
tne youngest cnild of the parties reached majority. This order 
was affirmed by this Court. This awarded actual ownership of 
property gifted to tne husband during marriage to the wife and 
allowed her use of gifted property until a later date. That is 
even a stronger case for reversal than the instant matter if 
the rule asserted by Mrs. Smith is accepted. Mr. and Mrs. 
Smith were jointly gifted the property on which the home was 
built. Mr. Bushell was gifted alone the property on which the 
home awarded to his wife was located. Yet this Court ruled 
that that was appropriate. Bushell v. I3ushell, 649 P.2d 85, 
86-87 (Utan 1982). In sustaining this ruling, this Court 
observed: 
The basic rule as to division of property 
between spouses is that the Court should 
make such order in relation to the property 
as may be equitable. Hamilton v. Hamilton, 
Utah 562 P.2d 235 (1977) . 
649 P.2d at 87. 
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The trial court in this case clearly applied these 
principles. The property in which both parties had invested 
substantial amounts of money and work was ordered sold and the 
net proceeds after payment to Mrs. Smith's parents were to be 
divided between them. 
Interestingly, the appellant does not make an issue of 
the fact that the court divided the value of her retirement 
oenefits as of tne date of separation of the parties rather 
than as of the date of the decree of divorce which is contrary 
to the ruling of this Court in Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 
1218 (Utah 1980). This Court stated in considering the objec-
tions of Mr. Fletcher that the equity of the home he had 
purchased subsequent to the filing of divorce should not have 
been considered a marital asset. "Tne marital estate is 
evaluated according to the existing property interests at the 
time the marriage is terminated by the decree of the court." 
615 P.2d at 1223. Application of this rule should require this 
Court to require modification of the Decree of Divorce to 
increase from $7,094 (R. between 244 and 245, Tr. 109, unmarked 
page) to $10,588.22 (ExniDit 9, Appendix B) the adjustment of 
the sum to be paid to respondent upon sale of the parties' home. 
The trial court appropriately excluded testimony of 
the intent of the Armstrongs in making the gift of the land to 
the parties. Exnibit 10 (Appendix A) is clear and 
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unambiguous. No assertion was made that this is not so. 
(R. 229-231). The Court correctly ruled such testimony 
prohibited by the Parole Evidence Rule. Hartman v. Potter, 596 
P.2d 653, 656 (Utah 1979); Commercial Bldg. Corp. v. Blair, 565 
P.2d 776, 787 (Utah, 1977). This is particularly true when 
Exhibit 10 was prepared by an attorney, Mr. Armstrong and all 
parties to the agreement relied on him. 
However, assuming arguendo that the trial court erred 
in applying the parol evidence rule, it would make no 
difference. Even if the property had been given to the parties 
by the Armstrongs intending it to be an advance on Mrs. Smitn's 
inheritance, the decision of the trial court should be upheld 
as is clear from the opinions of this court in Bushell, 
Workman, and Weaver, the trial court could properly decide the 
issues as it has when the equity so requires. In this cae, 
they do so require and the trial court should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court in this case properly ruled that the 
home of the parties should be sold and, after payment to the 
parents of the appellant for their interest in the land and 
repayment of money advanced the parties, the net proceeds of 
sale should be divided between the parties. This ruling should 
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be upheld by the Court. The respondent seeKs affirmation of 
the ruling of the trial court and an award of the costs 
incurred in responding to this appeal. 
DATED this 23 day of April, 1985 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondent to the following on this Qi3> day of April, 1985: 
David E. West 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST 
1300 Walker Center 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
0112J 
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MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT made this 10th day of May, 1978, by and between 
FRANK ARMSTRONG and AFTON C. ARMSTRONG, his wife, hereinafter called 
the "Armstrongs", and WALTER SMITH and EVE A. SMITH, his wife, herein-
after called the "Smiths", 
WITNESSETH: 
That the Armstrongs on December 25, 1977 gave an undivided one-
half interest in the hereinafter described property to the Smiths with 
the understanding that it would be particularly described when the 
parties returned from a vacation. It was to provide that if the 
Smiths ever sold the property the Armstrongs would have the first 
right of refusal to purchase same, and 
WHEREAS, the Smiths want to build on the property and the company 
making the loan to the Smiths require that the property be made sub-
ject to a lien of the payment of said loan, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that the Arm-
strongs will transfer the entire title to said property for the purpose 
of securing a loan, but for this purpose only, and that the Smiths will 
immediately reconvey a one-half interest back to the Armstrongs. 
In the event of a sale or partition of the property, the Armstrongs 
will have no monetary interest in any improvements placed on the 
property, their interest being only in the land and not in such improve-
ments. 
In the event of a sale or conveyance of the property, the Armstrongs 
are hereby given the first right to purchase at the price a bona fide 
purchaser is willing to pay for it, such right to be exercised within 
thirty days after written notice of such contemplated sale is given to 
the Armstrongs; otherwise, this right shall become null and void. 
The property is located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and is 
particularly described oft Exhibit "A" attached hereto and made a part hereof. 
Eve A. Smith / Afton C. Armstrong ^ / 
EXHIBIT "A" 
Cu—encing at a point 752 feet South from the Northeast corner of Section 
22, Township 2 South, Range 1 taat, Salt^take Meridian, and running thence 
Cast 6.17 feet; thence South 415 fetflflMiencc West 97.17 feet; thence North 
378 feet; thence Northwesterly lT^^VTeet, sore or less, to a point 266 
feet West of the point of beglnn^^r thence Lost 266 feet to beginning. Con-
taining one acre. 
Together with an easement and right of way fur ingress and egress and for 
water, sewer, power and gas lines and other public utilities over, In and 
upon the following described real property: Commencing 286 feet West of t 
Northeast corner of said Section 22, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt - ^ 
Meridian, and running thence South 752 feet; thence East 286 feet; thence 
North 25 feet; thence West 266 feet; thence North 727 feet; thence West 20 
feet to the point of beginning. 
Together with all water and water rights appurtenant to or used upon aaid 
premises, including water and water rights In the Upper Ellison Ditch. 
m 
UTAH RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD 
540 East 200 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
(801)355-3884 
BERTD. HUNSAKLR 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR 
September 13, 1984 
Eve Armstrong Smith 
2662 East 6200 South 
Salt Lake City, LIT 84121 
Deai Ms Si i i i tit 
As per our telephone conversation today, I have researched 
your account. The following is a list of your retirement account 
balances as you requested: 
September 1977 
December 1982 
September 1984 
S 587.23 
7,094.21 
10,528.22 
These figures reflect the dollar amounts available to you upon 
termination. 
questions c 
, r'easc :eel free tc co^tac^ 
*-.• ther set vice to 
Sincerelv, 
i7 •; 
*ZSK 
Ann M. Warlaumont 
Records Supervisor 
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jAMf:, • 4PG.;S>V* 
I ^ ) G U ' ;<A/.50N 
DAVIE > S . DOLOWI "I Z (0899) 
of and. for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
185 South State Street, Suite "*''=•: 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, UT 8414 7 / > 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
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J" Dennis Frederick presiding, The plain* ifi was 
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: was t 
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, T .S O € e s t 
m 
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p r e m i s e s and I 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The plaintiff and defendant were residents of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, when this action was filed and 
had been so for more than three months prior to that date. 
2. The parties were married on September 4, 1977, in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
3. The parties separated in December of 1982 and 
this action has been pending before the courts since January of 
1983. 
4. There have been no children born as issue of this 
marriage and none are expected. 
5. The defendant treated the plaintiff cruelly, 
causing her great mental distress and suffering by, when their 
interests diverged, refusing to discuss the problems confront-
ing the parties and to work out a joint set of values and 
activities to continue the marriage relationship. The dis-
tress that she suffered as a result of the divergence of their 
values and activities made continuation of the marriage rela-
tionship impossible. 
6. The defendant withdrew his counterclaim for di-
vorce at the commencement of the trial. 
7. Plaintiff expressed a desire, and the parties 
stipulated, that plaintiff could be awarded her maiden name of 
Eve Armstrong. 
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8. ' Tlh ip/iif iii!111 hi 1 |ni I filed t h a t t h e i t : wc ue no 
r e q u e s t f o r a l i m o n y by #«11! i f • i p i u t y o r ^ r e q u e s t t / e i t h e r 
p a r t y fo r a t t o r n e y f e e s 01 p o s t s t<> be a w a r d e d . 
9 . II In 11 in in l in i i I in | H in I 11 fd t ti 11 t in ii | f»r scaifi I 
p r o p e r t y c o u l d be d i v i d e d a s shown on E x h i b i t s 4-1 , t - 1 and 7-l"i 
w h i c h w e r e s t i p u l a t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e , 
I 11 rill! i pri r t i e» ," 1: ! ) HI i 1 HI I P 'I I 11 1 I I I in hi IIK 111 ' r i n 1 
p r o p e r t y a c q u i r e d by them <H 2 66* 2 E a s t 6 ? u u S o u t h s h o u l d be 
s r j ^ , | , | i i , Fi, j i q,.)i'|e b a l a n c e s h o u Id be pa i d • ^n i < > 11 Mi . 
and Mt •• . I r n r 1 A r m s t r o n g , t h e p a r e n t s of t h e p l a i n 1 i < I w e r e 
o w n e r s / f an u n d i v i d e d o n e - h a l f i n t e r e s t i1 • hf. r e a l p r o p e r t y 
UpMTi m\ "Ii I In In fin In i I I i - MI I I i1 i n I I lit *• fv ml 1 b - " V ' T r p e n -
s a t e d a t t h e t i m e of S d l e ft r K I P v a l u e o( t h a t i o w n e r s h i p 
i n t e r e s t . 
I I , T 1 h f •„ I ,' I « I , , !,' i ' ' - ; a i t 
shou!" 3 hf l i s t e r ] fi i Set i P * i t h Gu^i - : r t - . / - a~d , 
i d e a i x v , s o l d <i t th.'il p r i c e , FT ^H *-- ' ' - r p p . i c - * c -,:
 f , t h e 
p a r t i e s s h o u h! jiii* moM<jrn|i l)< 
A r m s t r o n g s h o u l d be $f>7 , rW)0, 0 0 , wv .*" r e p r e s e n t s cr .e-r . = l f 
of t h e v a l i :ie :: f t h e ] and on wl l i c h t h e home i s b u i l t w h i c h i s 
found t o be l l 3 5 , 0 0 0 0 0 . 
1 2 . I f t h e p a r t i e s d o r e c e i v e $ 2 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 00 f o r t h - : : 
h f i p a} »" m e n 1: ::: »f t II e s i :i n i s s e t o i ::i t i i :t j : a r a g r a pi 1 * ^ c •' * . 
t h e ; - ** ::i b e a n e t d i s t i i b u t i o i :i t o e a c h p a r t y of $61 , -
- 3 -
S3 
From the plaintiff's share of this sum should be deducted 
$3,253.50 which represents one-half of her retirement at the 
time of separation of the parties, it being agreed by the 
parties that all of her retirement should be awarded to her and 
this is an offset for that property which is determined to be a 
marital property and the sum of $3,253.50 should be added to 
the proceeds of sale awarded to the defendant so that the 
plaintiff would receive, assuming receipt of $122,808.70, a 
payment of $58,150.85, and the defendant a payment of 
$64,657.85. 
13. A gift was made by Mr. and Mrs. Frank Armstrong 
to the plaintiff and defendant of an undivided one-half inter-
est in the real property on which their home was built. The 
court finds from the written documents evidencing such gift, 
that it was a gift to both parties and should be considered as 
marital property. Each of the parties made contributions to 
construction of the home of property that they owned prior to 
the marriage or accumulated during the marriage of the parties 
in the form of contributions by the plaintiff of her savings 
and the defendant of money from the construction company which 
he operated. Plaintiff and defendant's evidence failed to 
establish that their contributions were other than that and 
should be considered as having been placed into the home as 
part of the normal use of funds by a married couple during the 
course of their marriage. 
14 . I "1 E ' :::! e f e i it d a i in 1: ::  i e ::3 j: • i i • :: i: t c t "1 :it • E • i n c i i i a g e c f t: "h e 
p a r t I e s , a i :i u mb e r c • f pa i n 111 i g s a i i d w a t e r c o l o r s t "h a t ! i a d t »e e n 
p a i n t e d hv h i «i f a t h e r and t l ie p a r t i e s w e r e g i v e n f i v e p a i n t i n g s 
a r 1 w i i I i • i i 1111' > i "» 11 ' I 111:!" d B f e i l :::i a i :t t ' s f a 11 i e r d i :i r i i :t g t h e c o u r s e of 
t h e nia i r i aqt«. 
From t r ie "r - T I r i n d i n c : , Uif fi'iur* ri"w 
m a k e s a n ^ e n f o r c f"*~c t ,^-r.n 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 . 'I'IM |il ii ill i l l >ifiunil'j I if diwiinletJ n if . : *-*•- < »f 
d i v o r c e t e r m i n a t i n g U K m a r r i a g e - . : t ^e.1 +> d e c r e e 
s h o u l d become f i n a l upon e n t r y . 
2 . IJ i i ill J in i 111) i;i h o u 111 11 < a w a r d e d t o e i t h e r p a r t y . 
3 . No costs or altnrney £ ees shou 16 be awarded to 
either party. 
$ 1" i1 i i n i iff '• 11n11) 11 111 d wa r 11e11 f ier maiden name of 
Eve Armstrong. 
5. The j * * - - * * *
 :. • * ia be awarded as her sole and 
separ ate properfv t f^c r^f personal property: 
P I ~i i-* : - e " 'q * *': < 
O n e - f o u r - p i e c e cou-h 
One chrome lamp 
Sr\ * ' ^eedl ewe: r r : 1 / w s 
One large white c-ffe* table 
Two single beds 
Director's chair 
One plastic bookshelf unit 
One antique desk and chair 
Redwood table and bench set 
The proceeds from the sa] e of 11 :te 1 972 
Ford Bronco 
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Oakleaf graphic 
1977 Datsun 
Oak table and chairs 
Oak coffee table 
One washer 
One dryer 
One large Mexican rug 
Three oak dressers 
Two portable color TV sets 
Small general kitchen appliances 
Queen-size bed 
Magazine rack 
Her crystal collection 
The oak bookshelf 
Medium graphic 
One-half of the dishes, silverware and 
cooking utensils acquired during the 
course of the marriage by the parties and 
all of the dishes, silverware, and cook-
ing utensils acquired by her prior to the 
marriage of the parties 
Microwave oven 
Brass lamp 
Hideabed sofa 
Four bookcase units 
6. The defendant should be awarded as his sole and 
separate property the following items of personal property: 
The upright freezer 
Stereo 
His books 
Brass lamp 
Queen-sized bed 
TV table 
Two bucket chairs 
Large beanbag 
Magazine rack 
Drafting table 
Black and white portable 
Patio table and chairs 
Power saws and equipment 
His personal effects and 
His tools 
Canvas rocking chair 
Sofa and chair set 
One oak endtable 
-6-
1^ 
TV 
belongings 
Refrigerator 
Three oak barstools 
One small Mexican rug 
Oak desk unit 
Tall oak dresser 
Two low oak dressers 
One oak headboard 
Dishes, silverware and cooking utensils 
that he brought into the marriage and 
one-half of the dishes, silverware and 
cooking utensils acquired bj the parties 
after their marriage 
One large graphic 
One sm.a 1 1 c ] oth pr i nt 
Bed lamp 
. Crystal wineset 
Bar supplies 
7 • I'l: i e "1 i :::> in. € - a i: i :i i: e a .1 p r o p e i 1: y a c q i :i :ii i: e :i 1: • y t h e 
part i e s d u r i n. g t h e c o u r s e o f t h e i r m a r r I a g e a. t 2 6 6 2 E a s t 6 2 0 0 
South shoul d be 1isted for sal e and sold, i deal ly, for at ] east 
12 5 0, 0 0 0 . 0 0 "IP! ' 1 I < ' p i o c e e d s : Ill:: i , i 111 • s 1 :i o u ] :i. Il : • i , I: i ] i z e < :i Il: i r s 1 : t < D 
p a. y 11 :i. e c o s t s a. n d e x p e n s e s o f s a 3 e a n d t h e e x I s t i n g m o r t g a g e 
o b i i g a t l o i • : f approx i m a t e l y $52 , 000 . 00 . Ther I , Mr . and 
M. r s . I i: a i :t > : A i m s t „. r o i i g s 1 :t o i :i 1 d "1: > e j : • a I. d $ 1 5 , ] 0 0 . 0 0 . "I h e r e m a i n -
i n g b a l a n c e s h o u l d b e d i v i d e d equa] l y b e t w e e n t h e p a r t : i e s p r o -
v i d e d , 1 i. o w e v e r 11 I a 1: , a £ 1: e r ::11 :i d i i i g f: h e p r : c e e d s e q i i a 3 3 \ , t h e 
s u m o f $ 3 , 2 5 3 . 5 0 s h a "1 3 b e s u b t r a c t e d f r o in t. h e £ u n d s t c • b e p a i d 
t o t h e p3 a. i n t i f f , Eve Smi t h , and. s h a 3 1 b e a d d e d t o t h e £unds t o 
b e p a i • ::! t ::: • d e f e i I d a i 11, W a "II t e r S iri i 11 i I £ 11 i. € s a 3 e w e i e 1: c 
a c h i e \ e 11 ie p r o c e e d s e n v i s i oi :ied by 11 Ie pa r t i e s , 11 ie > i :ie t 
p r o c e e d s of I h#j sa 1 H foi riivisu n wou ld be $ 1 2 ? » 8 0 h hQ, and. 
I I m "» t mm nil1 i1, I'm11 v I n ( i n i " I d t e i i , I I if BIIIII I I ' I" ^ H'> 
$C3 
would be paid to the plaintiff and $64,657.85 to the 
defendant. These sums would be adjusted as required in order 
to divide the net proceeds of sale if they are other than the 
$250,000.00 upon which the court based its conclusions and to 
reimburse Mr. and Mrs. Frank Armstrong for additional con-
tributions to the home and real property of the parties for 
payment of newly accrued taxes. 
8. The property at 2662 East 6200 South shall be 
listed in Gump & Ayers for sale unless the parties agree to 
another real estate agent to handle the sale for them. 
9. The plaintiff should be awarded the retirement 
fund accumulated by her at the University of Utah. 
10. The paintings by the defendant's father should be 
awarded to the defendant. 
DATED this day of November, 1984. 
J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
District Judge 
-8-
CKH'l I Fi i'A 1 \ 
I h e r e b y certify I ha1 I caused a true ani correct copy 
of the above and foreqoinq Findings nf V*\'\ and rnnr] us i ons of 
Law il: .• : 1 : • = • ma i 1! < • 11 I 11 i ,„- $ \ I; > v * - nil • •! ,„, I "''"i' • I ,„ 1<' > M i . Da v J ri 
E . W e s .'<"•' W a l k e r B u i l d i n g , S a l t L a k e C i t y , U t a ^ , R41 I 1 , l 
a t t o r n e y i ^ i p l a i n t i f f . 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
922 TK 
<:6 
HCITH t . TAVLO« 
J A M C S • . t e e 
JOHN A OA ML ST ROM 
GORDON L. WO»ERTS 
r. ROBERT ReCDER 
WILLIAM L. CRAWFORD 
LAWRCNCC C STEVENS 
DANIEL M. ALLRCD 
HOWARD J. MARSH 
VAN M. BOSS 
ERIE V. ftOO«MAN 
DAVID a OOLOWITZ 
KENT W. WINTCWHOLLER 
K A T M L t N * W. LOWE 
BARBARA f t ROLICH 
RANDY L. D R Y E R 
C H A R L E S H. T M R O N S O N 
DAVID R. BIRD 
RAYMOND J. ETCHEVERRY 
TRANCIS M. WIKSTROM 
DAVID W. TUNDERMANN 
HREGE B. CHRISTENSEN 
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GEORGE W LATiMEP 
CONSTANCE K. LUNOBERG 
VAL R. ANTC2AK 
PATRICK j . GARVEP 
SPENCER E. AUSTIN 
JOHN B. WILSON 
ROBERT c. HYDE 
CRAIG B. TERRY 
DAVID A. ANDERSON 
* E N " O. ROCHE 
PATRiCtA J. WINMILL 
JAN P. BENSON 
RANDv M. GPlMSHAW 
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A L I C E L. HEARST 
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Honorable J. Dennis Freder, •. 
Judge, Third Judicial District, Court 
240 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Ut r„ I „ I 
Re: Smith 
Ci v i 1 
Smith 
DR3-6 3 
Dear Judge F r ederi cki 
Enclosed you will find the proposed Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree that I have prepared in this 
matter. Mr. West and I have reviewed and edited several 
drafts. We have some areas where we have not been able to 
agree. 
Consequently, I arn submi11ing these to } ou pursuant to 
Rule 2,9 and would request you hold them to allow1 Mr. West time 
to file his objections — should he choose to do so. If he 
does not file objections, and they are executed and entered, I 
would appreciates it if you would have Joan c ,r : orm Un-
enclosed copies and return them to me in the stamped, 
self-addressed envelope T have enc] osed for that purpo -• 
If he does file objections, they deal with your 
rulings and from your notes I believe you will be able to 
resolve them, but we can get together and, by argument, resolve 
the m i £ and a s t h a t i s n e c e s s a r y. 
Thank you ±KJL JWL consideration and cooperation 
,S n i t i j i ^ J ]" y i a i i ^ i , 
D a v i d 
DSDrmjb 
Enclosures 
CC: Mr. David West 
CC: Mi W a l t e r S m i t h 
it u 
[Ftf 17—•—, 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
! of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
EVE A. SMITH, ) 
Plaintiff, ) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
v. ) 
) Case No. D-83-63 
WALTER THOMAS SMITH, ) 
) Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendant. ) 
* * * * * * * 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for 
trial on Thursday, the 20th day of September, 1984, the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding. the plaintiff was 
present in person and represented by counsel, David E. West. 
The defendant was present in person and represented by counsel, 
David S. Dolowitz. The court heard and considered the testi-
mony of the parties and their respective witnesses, considered 
the exhibits introduced into evidence and being advised in the 
premises and having considered the arguments and representa-
tions of counsel, and having entered its findings of fact and 
10? 
conclusions of law, now enters the following as its Decree of 
Divorce: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. The plaintiff is awarded a decree of divorce 
terminating the marriage of the parties, which decree shall 
become final upon entry. 
2. No alimony is awarded to either party. 
3. No costs or attorney fees are awarded to either 
property. 
4. The plaintiff is awarded as her sole and separate 
property the following items of personal property: 
Plastic endtable 
One-four-piece couch 
One chrome lamp 
Seven needlework pillows 
One large white coffee table 
Two single beds 
Director's chair 
One plastic bookshelf unit 
One antique desk and chair 
Redwood table and bench set 
The proceeds from the sale of the 1972 
Ford Bronco 
Oakleaf graphic 
1977 Datsun 
Oak table and chairs 
Oak coffee table 
One washer 
One dryer 
One large Mexican rug 
Three oak dressers 
Two portable color TV sets 
Small general kitchen appliances 
Queen-size bed 
Magazine rack 
Her crystal collection 
The oak bookshelf 
-2- tos 
Medium graphic 
One-half of the dishes, silverware and 
cooking utensils acquired during the 
course of the marriage by the parties and 
all of the dishes,m silverware, and cook-
ing utensils acquired by her prior to the 
marriage of the parties 
Microwave oven 
Brass lamp 
Hideabed sofa 
Four bookcase units 
5. The defendant is awarded as his sole and separate 
property the following items of personal property: 
The upright freezer 
Stereo 
His books 
Brass lamp 
Queen-sized bed 
TV table 
Two bucket chairs 
Large beanbag 
Magazine rack 
Drafting table 
Black and white portable TV 
Patio table and chairs 
Power saws and equipment 
His personal effects and belongings 
His tools 
Canvas rocking chair 
Sofa and chair set 
One oak endtable 
Refrigerator 
Three oak barstools 
One small Mexican rug 
Oak desk unit 
Tall oak dresser 
Two low oak dressers 
One oak headboard 
Dishes, silverware and cooking utensils 
that he brought into the marriage and 
one-half of the dishes, silverware and 
cooking utensils acquired by the 
parties after their marriage 
One large graphic 
One small cloth print 
-3- IS® 
Bed lamp 
Crystal wineset 
Bar supplies 
6. The home and real property acquired by the 
parties during the course of their marriage at 2662 East 6200 
South shall be listed for sale and sold for at least 
$250,000.00. The proceeds of the sale shall be utilized first 
to pay the costs and expenses of sale and the existing mortgage 
obligation of approximately $52,000.00. Then, Mr. and 
Mrs. Frank Armstrong shall be paid $75,100.00, and the remain-
ing balance should be divided equally between the parties pro-
vided, however, that after dividing the proceeds equally, the 
sum of $3,253.50 shall be subtracted from the monies to be paid 
to the plaintiff, Eve Smith, and shall be added to the funds to 
be paid to defendant, Walt Smith. The court determined that if 
the sale were to achieve the proceeds envisioned by the 
parties, the net proceeds of sale for division would be 
$122,808.69, and after adjustment as hereinabove stated, the 
sum of $58,150.85 would be paid to the plaintiff and $64,657.85 
would be paid to the defendant. These sums shall be adjusted 
as required in order to divide the net proceeds of sale if they 
are other than the $250,000.00 upon which the court based its 
conclusions and to reimburse Mr. and Mrs. Frank Armstrong for 
additional contributions to the home and real property of the 
parties for payment of newly accrued taxes. 
-4- i.i.0 
7. The property at 2662 East 6200 South shall be 
listed with Gump & Ayers Realtors for sale unless the parties 
agree to another real estate agent to handle the sale for them. 
8. The plaintiff is awarded her accumulated retire-
ment account at the University of Utah. 
9. The paintings by the defendant's father are 
awarded to the defendant. 
10. Plaintiff's maiden name of Eve Armstrong is 
restored to her. 
DATED this day of , 1984. 
J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
District Judge 
-5-
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing Decree of Divorce to be mailed, 
this ^#-day of November, 1984, to Mr. David E. West, 1300 
Walker Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, attorney for 
plaintiff. 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
9228K 
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David E. West 
Armstrong, Rawlings & West 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1300 Walker Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 359-2093 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS 
TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND DECREE 
Civil No. D83-63 
EVE A. SMITH, 
VS. 
WALTER THOMAS 
Plaintiff, ) 
SMITH, ) 
Defendant. ) 
COMES NOW the plaintiff above named and makes the 
following objections to the proposed Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law and Decree as have been submitted to the 
Court by the defendant herein: 
1. Proposed Finding No. 11 does not accurately state 
the findings of the Court. The following language should be 
added to proposed Finding No. 11: 
"Mr. and Mrs. Armstrong should also be reimbursed for 
contributions to the home and real property of the 
parties in the sum of $3r500.00 for the water line, 
$600.00 for the sod, and $3,500.00 for property taxes 
paid, for a total of $75,100.00. Mr. and Mrs. Arm-
strong should be reimbursed for additional contribu-
tions to the home and real property of the parties for 
the payment of newly accrued taxes." 
(The above language was contained in an earlier draft by 
defendant's counsel and was most likely omitted by 
oversight). 
2. Plaintiff objects to proposed Finding No. 13 in 
that it purports to cover too many factual issues and does 
not accurately reflect the bench ruling of the Court. 
Plaintiff proposes that Finding No. 13 be broken down into 
three separate findings as follows: 
"13. A gift was made by Mr. and Mrs. Frank Armstrong 
to the plaintiff and defendant of an undivided one-half 
interest in the real property upon which their home was 
built. The Court finds from the written documents 
evidencing such gift, that it was a gift to both 
parties and should be considered as marital property. 
14. Defendant claimed in this action that he should 
be entitled to reimbursement of $31,958.99 for amounts 
over and above the mortgage that he claimed to have 
contributed to the house. The Court finds that the 
evidence wholly failed to support that such amounts 
were contributed, and that in any event it would have 
been a normal contribution to the marriage and would 
have become marital property. 
15. Plaintiff's evidence showed that she contributed 
the sum of $8,000.00 into the house, which funds were 
deposited in advance of construction with the construc-
tion lender, and which funds were derived from the sale 
of property at Verona Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
which plaintiff owned prior to the marriage. The Court 
finds that this was a normal contribution to the 
marriage and became marital property." 
The above breakdown is important to the plaintiff because 
the Court in its ruling specifically found that there was a 
total failure of evidence to support the existence of any 
contributions by the defendant toward the purchase price of 
the home. 
3. Plaintiff further objects to paragraph 6 of the 
Decree ordering that the home should be sold for "at least" 
$250,000.00. This language would seem to restrict the sale 
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of the home if a $250,000.00 purchase price cannot be 
obtained. The sale of the home was based upon the parties' 
stipulation, but the stipulation did not include a minimum 
sales price. 
DATED this 3rd day of December, 1984. 
ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS & WEST 
By Q&J/ 
David E. West 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1300 Walker Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 359-2093 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Decree to David S. Dolowitz, Attorney for Defendant, 185 
South State Street, Suite 700, P.O. Box 11898, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, 84147, this 3 day of December, 1984. 
i_':r, i \ ' CL t r .KS OFFICE. 
C:.i: 'y ': Oo in t / l i t * -
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ (0899) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
EVE A. SMITH, ) 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v. ) 
) Case No. D-83-63 
WALTER THOMAS SMITH, ) 
) Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Defendant. ) 
* * * * * * * 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for 
trial on Thursday, the 20th day of September, 1984, the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding. The plaintiff was 
present in person and represented by counsel, David E. West. 
The defendant was present in person and represented by counsel, 
David S. Dolowitz. The court heard and considered the testi-
mony of the parties and their respective witnesses, considered 
the exhibits introduced into evidence and being advised in the 
premises and having considered the arguments and representa-
tions of counsel, then considered the objections of the 
Eu. 
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plaintiff to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law 
land decree of divorce on December 17, 1984, now enters the 
i following as its 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The plaintiff and defendant were residents of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, when this action was filed and 
had been so for more than three months prior to that date. 
2. The parties were married on September 4, 1977, in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
3. The parties separated in December of 1982 and 
this action has been pending before the courts since January of 
1983. 
4. There have been no children born as issue of this 
marriage and none are expected. 
5. The defendant treated the plaintiff cruelly, 
causing her great mental distress and suffering by, when their 
interests diverged, refusing to discuss the problems confront-
ing the parties and to work out a joint set of values and 
activities to continue the marriage relationship. The dis-
tress that she suffered as a result of the divergence of their 
lvalues and activities made continuation of the marriage rela-
tionship impossible. 
6. The defendant withdrew his counterclaim for di-
vorce at the commencement of the trial. 
"
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7. Plaintiff expressed a desire, and the parties 
stipulated, that plaintiff could be awarded her maiden name of 
Eve Armstrong. 
8. The parties stipulated that there would be no 
request for alimony by either party or a request by either 
party for attorney fees or costs to be awarded. 
9. The parties stipulated that their personal 
property could be divided as shown on Exhibits 4-D, 6-D and 7-D 
which were stipulated into evidence. 
10. The parties stipulated that the home and real 
property acquired by them at 2662 East 6200 South should be 
sold; that the mortgage balance should be paid; and that Mr. 
and Mrs. Frank Armstrong, the parents of the plaintiff, were 
owners of an undivided one-half interest in the real property 
upon which the home had been built and they should be compen-
sated at the time of sale for the value of that ownership 
interest. 
11. The value of the home is $250,000.00 and it 
should be listed for sale with Gump & Ayers Realtors, and, 
ideally, sold at that price. From the proceeds of sale, the 
parties should pay the mortgage balance, then Mr. and Mrs. 
Armstrong should be paid $67,500.00, which represents one-half 
of the value of the land on which the home is built which is 
found to be $135,000.00. Mr. and Mrs. Armstrong should also be 
-
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reimbursed for contributions to the home and real property of 
the parties paid, for a total of $75,100.00. 
12. If the parties do receive $250,000.00 for their 
home, after payment of the sums set out in paragraph 11 above, 
there would be a net distribution to each party of $61,404.35. 
From the plaintiff's share of this sum should be deducted 
$3,253.50 which represents one-half of her retirement at the 
time of separation of the parties, it being agreed by the 
parties that all of her retirement should be awarded to her and 
this is an offset for that property which is determined to be a 
marital property and the sum of $3,253.50 should be added to 
the proceeds of sale awarded to the defendant so that the 
plaintiff would receive, assuming receipt of $122,808.70, a 
payment of $58,150.85, and the defendant a payment of 
$64,657.85. 
13. A gift was made by Mr. and Mrs. Frank Armstrong 
to the plaintiff and defendant of an undivided one-half inter-
est in the real property on which their home was built. The 
court finds from the written documents evidencing such gift, 
that it was a gift to both parties and should be considered as 
marital property. Each of the parties made contributions to 
construction of the home of property that they owned prior to 
the marriage or accumulated during the marriage of the parties 
in the form of contributions by the plaintiff of her savings 
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and the defendant of money from the construction company which 
he operated. Plaintiff and defendant's evidence failed to 
establish that their contributions were other than that and 
should be considered as having been placed into the home as 
part of the normal use of funds by a married couple during the 
course of their marriage. 
14. The defendant owned prior to the marriage of the 
parties, a number of paintings and watercolors that had been 
painted by his father and the parties were given five paintings 
and watercolors by the defendant's father during the course of 
the marriage. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes and enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The plaintiff should be awarded a decree of 
divorce terminating the marriage of the parties, which decree 
should become final upon entry. 
2. No alimony should be awarded to either party. 
3. No costs or attorney fees should be awarded to 
either party. 
4. Plaintiff should be awarded her maiden name of 
Eve Armstrong. 
j 5. The plaintiff should be awarded as her sole and 
separate property the following items of personal property: 
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Plastic endtable 
One-four-piece couch 
One chrome lamp 
Seven needlework pillows 
One large white coffee table 
Two single beds 
Director *s chair 
One plastic bookshelf unit 
One antique desk and chair 
Redwood table and bench set 
The proceeds from the sale of the 1972 
Ford Bronco 
Oakleaf graphic 
1977 Datsun 
Oak table and chairs 
Oak coffee table 
One washer 
One dryer 
One large Mexican rug 
Three oak dressers 
Two portable color TV sets 
Small general kitchen appliances 
Queen-size bed 
Magazine rack 
Her crystal collection 
The oak bookshelf 
Medium graphic 
One-half of the dishes, silverware and 
cooking utensils acquired during the 
course of the marriage by the parties and 
all of the dishes, silverware, and cook-
ing utensils acquired by her prior to the 
marriage of the parties 
Microwave oven 
Brass lamp 
Hideabed sofa 
Four bookcase units 
6. The defendant should be awarded as his sole and 
separate property the following items of personal property: 
The upright freezer 
Stereo 
His books 
Brass lamp 
Queen-sized bed 
TV table 
Two bucket chairs 
Large beanbag 
Magazine rack 
Drafting table 
Black and white portable TV 
Patio table and chairs 
Power saws and equipment 
His personal effects and belongings 
His tools 
Canvas rocking chair 
Sofa and chair set 
One oak endtable 
Refrigerator 
Three oak barstools 
One small Mexican rug 
Oak desk unit 
Tall oak dresser 
Two low oak dressers 
One oak headboard 
Dishes, silverware and cooking utensils 
that he brought into the marriage and 
one-half of the dishes, silverware and 
cooking utensils acquired by the parties 
after their marriage 
One large graphic 
One small cloth print 
Bed lamp 
Crystal wineset 
Bar supplies 
7. The home and real property acquired by the 
parties during the course of their marriage at 2662 East 6200 
South should be listed for sale and sold, ideally, for 
$250,000.00. The proceeds of sale should be utilized first to 
pay the costs and expenses of sale and the existing mortgage 
obligation of approximately $52,000.00. Then, Mr. and 
Mrs. Frank Armstrong should be paid $75,100.00. The remain-
ing balance should be divided equally between the parties, pro-
vided, however, that after dividing the proceeds equally, the 
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sum of $3,253.50 shall be subtracted from the funds to be paid 
to the plaintiff, Eve Smith, and shall be added to the funds to 
be paid to defendant, Walter Smith. If the sale were to 
achieve the proceeds envisioned by the parties, the net 
proceeds of the sale for division would be $122,808.69, and 
after adjustment as heretofore stated, the sum of $58,150.85 
would be paid to the plaintiff and $64,657.85 to the 
defendant. These sums would be adjusted as required in order 
to divide the net proceeds of sale if they are other than the 
$250,000.00 upon which the court based its conclusions and to 
reimburse Mr. and Mrs. Frank Armstrong for additional con-
tributions to the home and real property of the parties for 
payment of newly accrued taxes. 
8. The property at 2662 East 6200 South shall be 
listed in Gump & Ayers for sale unless the parties agree to 
another real estate agent to handle the sale for them. 
9. The plaintiff should be awarded the retirement 
fund accumulated by her at the University of Utah. 
10. The paintings by the defendant's father should be 
awarded to the defendant. 
DATED th: 
Penda . ^ 
^
s
 J f f ^ a y of ^ erpynher, 198/T. 
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DIXON HINDI EY 
C*erk 
Deouty Cier 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law to be delivered, this XI day of December, 1984, to 
Mr. David E. West, ]300 Walker Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
84111, attorney for plaintiff. 
C 
'T)a~^/' 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
9227K 
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PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
85 South State Street, Suite 700 
t>.0. Box 11898 
Bait Lake City, UT 84347 
telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
EVE A. SMITH, 
V. 
* * * * * * * 
Plaintiff, 
SALTER THOMAS SMITH, 
Defendant. 
'fek \CH 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Case No. D-83-63 
Judge J . Dennis Freder ick 
• • * • • • • 
The above-entitled matter came before the court for 
rial on Thursday, the 20th day of September, 1984, the 
honorable J. Dennis Frederick presiding. the plaintiff was 
bresent in person and represented by counsel, David E. West. 
The defendant was present in person and represented by counsel , 
pavid S. Dolowitz. The court heard and considered the testi-
mony of the parties and their respective witnesses, considered 
the exhibits introduced into evidence and being advised in the 
premises and having considered the arguments and representa-
tions of counsel, and having considered the objections of the 
I*-* 
plaintiff to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law 
and decree on December 17, 1984, and how having entered its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, now enters the 
following as its Decree of Divorce: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. The plaintiff is awarded a decree of divorce 
terminating the marriage of the parties, which decree shall 
become final upon entry. 
2. No alimony is awarded to either party. 
3. No costs or attorney fees are awarded to either 
property. 
4. The plaintiff is awarded as her sole and separate 
property the following items of personal property: 
Plastic endtable 
One-four-piece couch 
One chrome lamp 
Seven needlework pillows 
One large white coffee table 
Two single beds 
Director's chair 
One plastic bookshelf unit 
One antique desk and chair 
Redwood table and bench set 
The proceeds from the sale of the 1972 
Ford Bronco 
Oakleaf graphic 
1977 Datsun 
Oak table and chairs 
Oak coffee table 
One washer 
One dryer 
One large Mexican rug 
Three oak dressers 
Two portable color TV sets 
Small general kitchen appliances 
-2-
,^3 X*'* 
Queen-size bed 
Magazine rack 
Her crystal collection 
The oak bookshelf 
Medium graphic 
One-half of the dishes, silverware and 
cooking utensils acquired during the 
course of the marriage by the parties and 
all of the dishes,m silverware, and cook-
ing utensils acquired by her prior to the 
marriage of the parties 
Microwave oven 
Brass lamp 
Hideabed sofa 
Four bookcase units 
5. The defendant is awarded as his sole and separate 
roperty the following items of personal property: 
The upright freezer 
Stereo 
His books 
Brass lamp 
Queen-sized bed 
TV table 
Two bucket chairs 
Large beanbag 
Magazine rack 
Drafting table 
Black and white portable TV 
Patio table and chairs 
Power saws and equipment 
His personal effects and belongings 
His tools 
Canvas rocking chair 
Sofa and chair set 
One oak endtable 
Refr igerator 
Three oak barstools 
One small Mexican rug 
Oak desk unit 
Tall oak dresser 
Two low oak dressers 
One oak headboard 
-3-
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Dishes, silverware and cooking utensils 
that he brought into the marriage and 
one-half of the dishes, silverware and 
cooking utensils acquired by the 
parties after their marriage 
One large graphic 
One small cloth print 
Bed lamp 
Crystal wineset 
Bar supplies 
6. The home and real property acquired by the 
parties during the course of their marriage at 2662 East 6200 
South shall be listed for sale and sold for $250,000,00. The 
proceeds of the sale shall be utilized first to pay the costs 
and expenses of sale and the existing mortgage obligation of 
approximately $52,000,00. Then, Mr. and Mrs. Frank Armstrong 
shall be paid $75,100.00, and the remaining balance should be 
divided equally between the parties provided, however, that 
after dividing the proceeds equally, the sum of $3,253.50 shall 
be subtracted from the monies to be paid to the plaintiff, Eve 
Smith, and shall be added to the funds to be paid to defendant, 
Walt Smith. The court determined that if the sale were to 
achieve the proceeds envisioned by the parties, the net 
proceeds of sale for division would be $122,808.69, and after 
^adjustment as hereinabove stated, the sum of $58,150.85 would 
|be paid to the plaintiff and $64,657.85 would be paid to the 
defendant. These sums shall be adjusted as required in order 
to divide the net proceeds of sale if they are other than the 
$250,000.00 upon which the court based its conclusions and to 
reimburse Mr. and Mrs. Frank Armstrong for additional 
contributions to the home and real property of the parties for 
payment of newly accrued taxes, Mr. and Mrs. Armstrong should 
be reimbursed for additional contributions t the home and real 
property of the parties for the payment of newly accrued taxes. 
7. The property at 2662 East 6200 South shall be 
listed with Gump & Ayers Realtors for sale unless the parties 
agree to another real estate agent to handle the sale for them. 
8. The plaintiff is awarded her accumulated retire-
ment account at the University of Utah. 
9. The paintings by the defendant's father are 
awarded to the defendant. 
10. Plaintiff's maiden name of Eve Armstrong is 
restored to her. ^ 
DATED this ^ d a y of JOA • , 198/. 
EST 
DIXON HIMC^EY 
Dat-o<. wv 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing Decree of Divorce to be delivered, 
this 2|^ay of i^^^z^^On. 
_, ]984, to Mr. David E. West, 
1300 Walker Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, attorney for 
plaintiff. 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ tf 
9228K 
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